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SERVICE DELIVERY PROTESTS, 
STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS AND THE 
FAILURE OF LOCAL DEMOCRACY 




Although the two countries are thousands of miles apart, Uganda and South Africa have both 
experienced service delivery protests in recent years. The protests have been directed mainly 
at local governments, although in Uganda some are directed at private service providers 
such as the electricity distributor, Umeme. There are a number of parallels and divergences 
between the two countries, particularly in relation to the causes and the nature that the protests 
have taken. Both countries are experiencing challenges in implementing decentralisation, 
which has mainly been characterised by a failure to effectively involve local communities 
in decision-making as a way of effecting local democracy. Mismanagement, corruption, 
and incapacity to deliver at the local levels are common to both countries. The divergences 
relate mainly to the level of organisation, frequency and magnitude of the protests. The local 
government legal framework of Uganda does not emphasise service delivery as much as the 
South African legal framework does. There is an urgent need for both countries to make 
local democracy work by building civic competence and creating operational and effective 
structures for civic participation in local affairs.
Keywords: local government
I IntroDuctIon
In spite of the differences in economic development, Uganda and South 
Africa are both facing challenges as regards service delivery at local levels. 
As a result, both countries have in recent years been hit by service delivery 
protests. While the magnitude, levels of organisation and intensity of the 
protests may differ, with the South African protests being bigger in intensity 
and frequency, there are some common factors that define the occurrence of 
the protests. Historically, albeit with different contexts, both countries have 
histories of draconian and authoritarian rule. In the 1990s, both countries were
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viewed as ‘the new generation of African states that are seen as turning their 
back on decades of authoritarian rule, instead embracing open government’.1 
Additionally, both countries embraced decentralisation and committed to 
the devolution of powers and democratic participation at the local level.2 
Unfortunately, however, both countries have not attained well-managed 
local governments and efficient service delivery as was anticipated; there are 
problems of local accountability and lack of adequate resources to perform 
the functions devolved.3
Similarly, both countries adopted policies that pushed for restructuring 
and privatisation of public enterprises and services. In the case of Uganda, 
privatisation was vigorously pursued as part of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) embraced in the late 1980s.4 For South Africa, 
privatisation was pursued as part of the Growth, Employment and Distributive 
policy adopted in 1996.5 It is not within the scope of this article to discuss 
the successes and failures of privatisation in South Africa and Uganda. 
What needs to be noted though is that in both countries, privatisation has 
had an impact on the provision of public services. In some cases, services 
previously provided by government were devolved to private entities, while 
in other cases, government entities, including local governments, especially 
in South Africa, started pursuing policies of cost recovery and operated in a 
commercial manner. All this has had an impact on the delivery of some services 
arising mainly from tariff increments and strict methods of debt recovery. 
Yet, as is the case in many African countries that embraced privatisation, the 
benefits associated with privatisation such as higher profitability, improved 
performance and productivity have not been attained.6
In both countries, there has been a failure of local democracy, reflected in 
the increasing marginalisation of local communities, failure to be responsive 
to the needs of the poor and to effectively consider local voices in decision-
making. This has vitiated one of the motivations of decentralisation, which 
is the promotion of better utilisation of resources for the needs of local 
communities.7 This though does not mean that those functions reserved 
1 J Hearn ‘Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, 
Ghana and uganda’ Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper 368 <http://www.eldis.
org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC6995.pdf> 2. 
2 CL Dauda ‘Democracy and Decentralisation: Local Politics, Marginalisation and Political 
Accountability in uganda and South Africa’ (2006) 26 Public Administration and Development 
291, 292. 
3 FP Kulipossa ‘Decentralisation and Democracy in Developing Countries: An Overview’ (2004) 
14 Development in Practice 769, 773. 
4 See J Oloka-Onyango ‘Poverty, Human Rights and the Quest for Sustainable Human Development 
in Structurally-Adjusted uganda’ (2000) 18 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 23.
5 See J Afeikhena ‘Privatisation and Regulation in South Africa: An Evaluation’ (September 2004) 
National Institute for Economic Policy <http://www.competition-regulation.org.uk/conferences/
southafrica04/Afeikhena.pdf>. 
6 Ibid 2.
7 N Devas & u Grant ‘Local Government Decision-making – Citizen Participation and Local 
Accountability: Some Evidence from Kenya and uganda’ (2003) 23 Public Administration and 
Development 307, 307.
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for the central governments are well-managed. In Uganda, for instance, 
mismanagement, under-funding and corruption characterise all central 
government institutions.8
It is against the above background that this article sets out to study the 
service delivery protests that Uganda and South Africa have experienced. The 
article draws parallels and divergences by showing that the factors that have 
influenced the protests in South Africa are not different from those in uganda; 
and reflect the failure of local democracy in both countries. The divergences 
appear mainly in the magnitude, intensity and levels of organisation that the 
protests have taken, yet similarities include the fact that in both cases, at the 
frontlines of the violent protests has been unemployed youths.
The article is divided into three parts: The first part explores the subject of 
service delivery in the context of local government, analysing decentralisation 
trends in both countries and the relationship with service delivery. The first 
part also describes and analyses the causes and form which the service 
delivery protests have taken in both countries. The second part synthesises 
the parallels and divergences between causes and nature of the protests in 
the two countries. While the last part draws conclusions and makes some 
recommendations on how the pitfalls of local government that have resulted 
into the protests could be overcome.
II  servIce DelIvery anD the local government context
One of the key features which define service delivery in many countries 
is decentralisation and the systems of local government. Decentralisation 
could be understood as the assignment of fiscal, political and administrative 
responsibilities by the central government to lower level governments, 
characterised by delegation and devolution.9 The motivation for 
decentralisation in Uganda and South Africa is not any different from that 
which has informed decentralisation the world-over. The argument is that 
decentralisation results in better use of resources by ensuring that resource 
use decisions will reflect the needs of the citizens at the local level.10 It is 
argued that partly because of the access to information about local conditions, 
which the centre may find hard to get, decentralised governments will have 
better knowledge of local preferences. This helps overcome the indifference 
usually associated with central government bureaucrats.11 Yet, in addition to 
resulting in plans that answer to the people’s needs, decentralisation helps 
to enlist support for the implementation of plans since it creates a sense of 
8 It is not within the scope of this article to address the deficiencies of the central government 
institutions responsible for the discharge of several functions related to service delivery. The 
scope of the article is defined to narrowly focus on local government. 
9 J Litvack, J Ahmad & R Bird ‘Rethinking Decentralization in Developing Countries’ (1998) The 
Int Bank of Reconstruction and Development 4.
10 Devas & Grant (note 7 above) 307.
11 KR Hope ‘Decentralisation and Local Governance Theory and the Practice in Botswana’ (2000) 
17 Development Southern Africa 519, 520.
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ownership.12 Decentralisation has also been viewed as a mechanism to disperse 
power; to ensure political stability; to bring representative governance closer 
to citizens; and to improve the accountability and responsiveness of local 
leaders.13 Central provision of services has also been perceived as ineffective 
because of the difficulties of coordinating large-scale activities.14
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to make a case for and 
against decentralisation, it is worthwhile to briefly explore some of the 
cons of decentralisation. It has been argued that decentralisation breeds 
inequality before the law by subjecting different localities to different 
regimes of regulation, yet all services and other standards should be the same 
for all citizens.15 The effective local utilisation of resources advantage has 
been contested on the grounds that in some cases a local jurisdiction may 
actually be subsidising its neighbours when residents use facilities without 
their local governments contributing to them in what has been called ‘free 
rider’.16 Additionally, local governments may not be able and equipped to 
handle inherently complex problems, which may require the superior skills 
of centralised administration.17 Decentralisation of policy formulation and 
implementation could also result in what has been described as ‘net loss of 
political control’,18 which could compromise the regulatory functions of the 
state.
At the same time, it is important to note that, in practice, most local 
government systems are designed in such a manner that local autonomy is 
exercised within the framework of standards set by national legislation and 
policy. Examples in the case of South Africa are policies that define minimum 
levels of services such as water, which all municipalities are under duty to 
implement.
Additionally, the democracy related advantages of decentralisation are 
based on the assumption that the local citizens will always have an influence 
on decisions made by their local governments.19 Evidence from many parts of 
the world however suggests that local authorities have largely failed to move 
beyond mere consultation to engaging the poor and taking into account their 
needs in decision-making.20 This is the major detraction that has derailed 
local democracy in Uganda.21
12 D Conyers ‘Decentralization: The Latest Fashion in Development Administration?’ (1983) 3 
Public Administration and Development, 97, 100. 
13 J Akin, P Hutchinson & K Strumpf ‘Decentralisation and Government Provision of Public 
Goods: The Public Health Sector in uganda’ (2005) 41 J of Development Studies 1417, 1418.
14 Ibid 1420. 
15 MS De Vries ‘The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis of Arguments and 
Practices in European Countries’ (2000) 38 European J of Political Research 193, 199.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid 199–200. 
18 AB Whitford ‘Decentralization and Political Control of the Bureaucracy’ (2002) 14 J of 
Theoretical Politics 167.
19 Devas & Grant (note 7 above) 307.
20 Ibid 309.
21 Devas & Grant (note 7 above) 313. 
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It is against this background that the decentralisation processes in Uganda 
and South Africa and their impact on service delivery should be understood. 
Some of the contestations of the perceived advantages of decentralisation may 
emerge from this exploration.
(a)  Uganda
Decentralisation in Uganda dates back to the colonial state as used to hold 
together the different ethnic communities that were artificially amalgamated 
into a state. The system however disintegrated after independence with 
the adoption of the Republican Constitution in 1967, intended to build a 
strong unified central government to define the new state. The last blow to 
decentralisation aspirations came during the dictatorship of the Idi Amin 
government (1971 to 1979). However, in 1987 the new National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) government, sought to revive local governance. In 1993, 
the Local Government (Resistance Council) Statute, Act 15 of 1993, was 
adopted, devolving a number of powers to elected local councils. A more 
comprehensive legal framework came when a new Constitution was adopted 
in 1995. The Constitution announced that the state would be guided by 
the principle of decentralisation and devolution of governmental functions 
and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage 
and direct their own affairs.22 Among the constitutional local government 
principles is the principle of ensuring peoples’ participation and democratic 
control in decision-making, in addition to ensuring the full realisation of 
democratic governance at all local levels.23
In terms of functions, the local governments exercise executive 
functions, defined legislative powers and, uniquely, some judicial powers.24 
Unfortunately, however, the Constitution is silent on the obligations of local 
governments as regards the provision of services. Although one would have 
expected these obligations to be detailed in the Local Government Act,25 
the principal local government legislation, this is not the case. Without any 
indication that there is an obligation to provide these, the different functions 
of local government that relate to the provision of services are only detailed in 
schedule 2 of the Act. Although there is use of the word ‘services’ in the body 
of the Act, this is immediately linked to the schedule; moreover the language 
used is not obligatory: ‘a local government council shall within the area of its 
jurisdiction provide services as it deems fit … ‘.26
The functions to be discharged by the districts relevant to social services 
include: medical and health services, other than those reserved for the central 
government; water services, which includes provision and maintenance of 
water supplies in liaison with the ministry responsible for natural resources; 
22 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda objective II(iii). 
23 Ibid art 176(2)(b)(c). 
24 See Local Council Courts Act 2006. 
25 ‘Laws of uganda’ (2000) Chapter 243 <http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/243>.
26 Local Government Act s 30(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
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road services, which includes the construction, rehabilitation and maintenance 
of roads not under central government; aiding and supporting the establishment 
of schools, hospitals, libraries and homes of the aged, among others; providing 
and managing sporting and recreation facilities and programmes for informal 
education; and remedial social welfare programmes aimed at the alleviation 
of social distress.
The functions of urban councils include: street lighting, fire brigade services, 
clinics and dispensaries; public lavatories, public baths and swimming pools; 
sanitary services for the removal and disposal of night soil, rubbish, carcasses 
of dead animals and all kinds of refuse; water supplies outside the jurisdiction 
of National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC); education services; 
and maintenance of roads outside the jurisdiction of the central government.
Local governments can levy, charge and collect fees and taxes, including 
rates, rents, royalties, stamp duties, personal graduated tax, and registration and 
licensing fees.27 In addition to the levies, fees and charges, local governments 
are entitled to grants from the central government drawn from the consolidated 
fund. The grants include unconditional, conditional and equalisation grants.28 
In spite of the above sources of funding, the capacity of local governments to 
collect local taxes has been constrained by a number of factors, including the 
limited local tax base. In 2005, graduated tax, which was a head tax imposed 
on all working adults in the locality, was abolished, substantially reducing 
the finances of the local governments. Although graduated tax was the major 
source of income for these governments, it remained unpopular because of 
the obscure system of its assessment and the brutal manner in which it was 
collected by law enforcement agencies.29 As regards the grants, ‘[t]he transfer 
system has become very complex’; there are ‘multiple grants each with its own 
conditions, often allowing local councils limited scope for choice in relation 
to local circumstances’.30 Yet, in many cases, the grants are consumed by 
administrative and operational costs, including salaries, with little or none 
being used for service delivery.31 Additionally, as indicated by Nick Devas and 
Ursula Grant,32 there are problems of lack of transparency, corruption, rent 
seeking, and abuse of tender procedures. All these have minimised effective 
mobilisation and use of resources.
The ability of councils to hold meetings has also been constrained because 
of the absence of funds to pay the allowances of the councillors. This has 
resulted in councillors not being able to discharge their oversight functions.33 
The resource crisis has been exacerbated by the unprincipled and spontaneous 
creation of districts, done by the ruling party as a form of gerrymandering and 
27 Local Government Act s 80(1). 
28 Ibid s 83(1).
29 P Francis & R James ‘Balancing Rural Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The 
Contradictions of uganda’s Decentralization Program’ (2003) 31 World Development 325, 330.
30 Devas & Grant (note 7 above) 313. 
31 Francis & James (note 29 above) 332.
32 Devas & Grant (note 7 above) 313. 
33 Ibid 34.
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as a tool for political patronage.34 By 1994, the country had only 44 districts, 
which increased to 55 in 2005 and now stand at over 111 and will increase to 
136 with the recent announcement that 25 new districts would be created if 
approved by Parliament.35 Unfortunately, these districts have increased the 
administrative expenses at local government level and depleted resources that 
would otherwise have been expended on providing services.
Corruption and misappropriation of resources have also constrained the 
performance of local governments and their ability to deliver services. On 
many occasions, the Inspectorate of Government, the watch-dog which 
investigates corruption cases, has ranked districts as the most corrupt public 
institutions.36 Reports also indicate that many districts have flouted and abused 
the procurement procedures, by among others not following competitive 
bidding and ensuring proper documentation.37 In 2011, the Auditor General’s 
Report indicated that in the Financial Year 2010/2011, goods and services 
worth over 24-billion shillings had been procured by local governments 
without following the procurement laws and guidelines.38
The most important inefficiency has been the failure to achieve effective 
local participation in decision-making. On paper, the district planning process 
is supposed to be bottom-up, with every village preparing a Community 
Action Plan (CAP), which feeds into the parish CAP, through to the sub-county 
and ultimately the district plan, only finalised after a participatory budget 
conference. The practice is however different; CAP processes do not take 
place in many villages and parishes; and when this happens, the plans never 
make their way up.39 Although in some districts budget planning meetings 
are convened, the attendance is usually sporadic, mainly due to inadequate 
dissemination of information on the process. Yet, even where the processes 
have been implemented consistently, community members consulted do not 
see their suggestions on priority areas implemented.40 Additionally, the failure 
of most local councils to convene meetings has constrained their ability to 
influence decisions at the local levels. This has left critical policy decisions 
in the hands of bureaucrats, yet these are not as directly accountable to the 
people as the elected representatives.
It should also be noted that the central government has failed to relinquish 
much of the powers needed by the local governments in line with the policy 
34 See E Green ‘District Creation and Decentralisation in uganda’ (2008) Development Studies 
Institute, London School of Economics Working Paper Series 2.
35 ‘25 More Districts Created’ New Vision (19 July 2012).
36 Y Mugerwa ‘uganda: Districts Remain Most Corrupt Bodies’ The Monitor (16 June 2008) 
<http://allafrica com/stories/200806160911 html>.
37 Inspectorate of Government ‘Second Annual Report on Corruption Trends in Uganda: Using the 
Date Tracking Mechanism’ (November 2011) <http://www.igg.go.ug/static/files/publications/
doc.pdf> 38.
38 Office of the Auditor General Annual Report of the Auditor General for the Year Ended 30th June 
2011  Volume 1, Performance Report 13.
39 Francis & James (note 29 above) 331.
40 L Nyirinkindi ‘Economic and Social Rights, Service Delivery and Local Government in uganda’ 
(2007) HURIPEC Working Paper 13, 23. 
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on decentralisation. Instead, various line ministries have continued to 
implement various programmes at the local levels, albeit in an uncoordinated 
manner. The ministries have failed to integrate the various local government 
structures, including the planning committees, into their programmes. It has 
been argued that quality time, which should be spent by local governments on 
service delivery, is instead spent responding to the plethora of uncoordinated 
supervision and accountability processes required by the various ministries.41
The leadership problems that local governments are facing could also be 
related to the leadership challenges the country as a whole is facing. There 
is a gradual loss of confidence in the state, arising mainly from corruption, 
unresponsiveness and sometimes arrogance of state officials. More broadly, 
loss of confidence in the state is attributed to the manner in which the state 
has been managed.42
On ascending to power in 1986, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
failed to build political institutions that enjoyed a wide degree of political 
acceptability among different socio-political groups.43 Indeed, state sovereignty 
did not lie with legal institutions; instead, it laid with the NRM’s political 
organs such as the NRM Secretariat, the Army High Command and the Army 
Council.44 Although the first elections organised in 1989 were celebrated as 
having advanced democracy in a country that had been under dictatorial rule 
for over two decades,45 the elections were faulted. One of the major flaws was 
the demonstration by the NRM that it would not tolerate elections contested 
on a competitive political party basis, an approach that threatened its hold on 
power.46 This marked the birth of ‘the movement’ political system, a euphemistic 
expression of one-party rule, which the NRM argued was an all inclusive system 
that avoided the pitfalls of the multi-party system which had divided Uganda 
along ethnic and religious lines and resulted in conflict.47
Although the year 2005 saw reversion to the multi-party system, the 
‘no-party’ movement system’s culture has remained firmly rooted within 
several institutions of the state and has stifled smooth operation of the multi-
party system.48 This has alienated those with divergent political views, both 
politicians and ordinary citizens, and is gradually pushing people to oppose 
the government in the face of increasing levels of poverty and inefficient/
non-service delivery.
41 Ibid 18.
42 W Muhumuza ‘From Fundamental Change to No Change: The NRM and Democratization in 
uganda’ 41 Les Cahiers D’Afrique De L’est 21, 22. 
43 D Mudoola ‘Institutional Building: The Case of the NRM and the Military in uganda 1986–9’ in 
HB Hansen & M Twaddle (eds) Changing Uganda  The Dilemma of Structural Adjustment and 
Revolutionary Change (Eastern African Studies) (1991) 230, 231.
44 Ibid 235. 
45 N Kafir ‘The uganda Elections of 1989: Power, Popularism and Democratization’ in Hansen & 
Twaddle (note 43 above) 247, 249.
46 Ibid 252. 
47 C Mbazira ‘Constructing a New Dawn? Assessing Democracy and Multi-part Politics in NRM’s 
uganda (2005 – 2011)’ (2011) HuRIPEC Working Paper 33, 11. 
48 Ibid 28. 
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The loss of confidence is also linked to recent electoral flaws including 
intimidation of voters and candidates, militarization of the processes, vote 
buying, disenfranchisement, rigging and ballot box stuffing. Additionally, the 
Electoral Commission has failed to exude impartiality and remains appointed 
by the President. Although the appointment requires parliamentary approval, 
Parliament has largely remained a rubber-stamping institution.49
It is against the above context, characterised among others by the failure to 
meaningfully engage the local citizens, that the service delivery protests in 
Uganda should be understood.
(i)  The protests in Uganda
Different from South Africa, there has not been any serious study on the 
nature and form that service delivery protests have taken in Uganda. The 
descriptions in this section are based on scanty media reports and on the 
author’s own observations. It should be noted from the onset that the service 
delivery protests in Uganda have not been as massive, drawn-out and well 
organised as those in South Africa. Nonetheless, the media on a daily basis 
carries reports of residents protesting against poor or non-delivery of services. 
In some cases, the protests have been directed not necessarily at government 
structures, but at service providing corporations. This includes the NWSC, a 
government corporation responsible for processing and distributing water, and 
umeme, an electricity distributor and a subsidiary of South Africa’s Eskom. 
The protests directed at local government officials have mainly been those 
related to poor roads, either due to non-maintenance or delayed/abandoned 
rehabilitations, which have unreasonably inconvenienced residents. One such 
protest happened in August 2009, when residents of a village called Busabala 
accosted the Wakiso District chairperson, lured him to a dusty road with 
many potholes, made him sit down surrounded by a mob, and sprayed him 
with dust, pouring some in his posh vehicle while shouting that he should 
also feel the dust like them.50 In another case, residents of Rwamagwa in 
Rakai District planted banana stems in the middle of a gravel road, stating 
that because of the road’s poor state, it was no-longer useful as a road, but as 
a garden.51
There have also been dramatic protests over the poor state of healthcare 
services. In October 2011, a man undressed in protest at a government health 
centre where he had taken a boy for treatment, but was asked to provide medical 
supplies. The man was later joined by other residents and local politicians in 
support of the protest.52 In another incident, in February 2011, patients in the 
49 See C Mbazira ‘Reform Long Overdue: A Comparative Analysis of Improvements Necessary to 
Electoral Laws, Processes and Institutions In uganda’ (2009) HURIPEC Working Paper 26.
50 See J Lule ‘Kyeyune won’t Penalise Attackers’ New Vision (5 August 2009) <http://www.
newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/690394>.
51 See ‘Residents in Rwamagwa Protest over Bad Roads’ (11 November 2011) <http://www.ugpulse.
com/uganda-news/government/residents-in-rwamagwa-protest-over-bad-roads/22709.aspx>. 
52 ‘uganda: Man Strips Naked in Protest of Poor Health Services’ (10 May 2011) <http://www.nl-aid.
org/continent/sub-saharan-africa/uganda-man-strips-naked-in-protest-of-poor-health-service>.
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orthopaedic ward at Mulago Hospital, the oldest and biggest national referral 
hospital, protested about the lack of services by parading their beds outside 
the ward. It later emerged that a number of them had actually paid bribes to 
doctors to get services, but had still not been attended to.53 Another protest 
in this sector was by patients in an Ebola isolation ward in Kagadi hospital. 
Uganda was in July 2012 attacked by the Ebola virus, a deadly contagious 
virus with no known cure. To contain the spread of the virus, isolation wards 
were set up in areas hit by the virus. By the beginning of August 2012, there 
was evidence that government was not taking good care of the patients in the 
isolation wards. On 2 August 2012, this forced patients at Kagadi Hospital 
isolation ward to protest by walking out of the ward demanding food and 
medical attention. Medical staff not wearing protective gear fled as the 
patients walked out of the ward. The situation was only controlled by the 
Deputy Resident District Commissioner who, dressed in protective gear, 
talked down the patients.54 Three days later, residents of Jinja protested at the 
maternity ward of the Jinja Referral Hospital after the death of an expectant 
mother. The mother had been neglected after her relatives failed to raise a 
bribe of approximately US$400 demanded by medical staff before they would 
carry out surgery on her. By the time they raised half of the money, it was too 
late, the mother died on the operating table. Residents stormed the hospital 
demanding the arrest of the gynaecologists who had demanded the bribe.55
The electricity related protests have resulted either from continuous 
load-shedding, increased tariffs or failure to attend to technical problems 
resulting into black-outs.56 Other electricity related mishaps that have spurred 
resentment of Umeme include poor billing, poor monitoring of services in 
some cases leading to death, significant increment of tariffs yet for poorly 
managed services and non-responsiveness to customer needs. In one village 
called Nakaseke, residents ran out of patience when a broken transformer 
had not been repaired a month after it broke down. The residents protested 
by stoning electricity poles and blockading roads. A few days later a new 
transformer was delivered by Umeme.57
In some cases, the protests have been led by politicians, especially members 
of Parliament, who are always eager to demonstrate that they care about the 
needs of their people.58 Although the demographics of the protests depend on 
the community, at the frontlines of the protests, especially those characterised 
by violence, have mainly been unemployed youths. At the moment, Uganda 
53 See ‘Patients’ Protest Blamed on unethical Health Workers’ Daily Monitor (28 February 2012). 
54 ‘Two New Ebola Deaths as Patients go on Strike’ Daily Monitor (2 August 2012). 
55 ‘Gynecologist Arrested over Death of Patient’ New Vision (4 August 2012). 
56 See ‘New Power Tariffs: Gayaza Residents Demonstrate’ (17 January 2012) <http://
ugandaradionetwork.com/a/story.php?s=39702>. 
57 See ‘umeme Restores Power in Nakaseke’ (17 November 2011) <http://ugandaradionetwork.
com/a/story.php?s=38445>.
58 See for instance ‘MP to Mobilise Protest Over Road’ The Monitor (29 March 2007) <http://www.
accessmylibrary com/article-1G1-161232650/mp-mobilise-protest-over.html>; and S Arinaitwe 
‘Lukyamuzi Protests Bad Roads’ Daily Monitor (24 July 2012) <http://www.monitor.co.ug/
News/National/Lukyamuzi+protests+bad+roads/-/688334/1461610/-/l86pll/-/index.html>. 
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has the youngest population in the world, with over 70 per cent of the country’s 
population being under the age of 30 years.59 Unfortunately, a large number 
of youths are unemployed and roam the streets in search of a livelihood. By 
2007, it was estimated that youth unemployment stood at 22 per cent, and even 
higher among youth with university degrees and those in rural areas.60 Such 
large numbers of unemployed youths living in poverty have not just been easy 
targets for those organising protests, but have spontaneously been attracted to 
avenues through which to vent their frustration at a government that has not 
met their needs.
Another factor to which the increasing levels of service delivery protests and 
the violence could be attributed to is the breakdown of the Rule of Law. The 
breakdown in the Rule of Law is explained by the inefficiency of law, justice 
and order institutions, due to corruption and mal-administration. This has 
resulted in people increasingly taking the law into their hands, in many cases 
through mob-justice. There have been many cases of people attacking police 
stations and demanding the release of suspects so that they are dealt with by 
the mobs rather than the corrupt and inefficient police.61 This approach has 
been extended to service delivery structures; in the face of unresponsiveness, 
many residents have chosen violence as a solution. In some cases, as seen 
in one of the electricity cases described above, this approach has actually 
worked, with services being delivered to quell the violence. A few weeks after 
spraying the Wakiso District chairperson with dust, work on the Busabala 
road began. In the days after the incident, one of the country’s newspapers 
carried a story in which it was stated ‘[w]hat the people did was akin to mob 
justice, and it would appear that if this trend continues, more of our leaders 
will dance to the same unpleasant melodies’.62
The country has been characterised by electoral related protests, mainly 
arising from mismanagement and irregular elections, at least in perception. 
Recently, the electoral anarchy came to the fore in the 2011 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. The elections were characterised by massive voter 
bribery and disenfranchisement of voters, especially in areas believed to 
support the opposition. In April 2011, inspired by the Arab spring, opposition 
politicians rejected the results, which gave the NRM victory, and mobilised 
people to take to the streets in what was described as ‘walk-to-work’. The 
election fracas coincided with rising costs of living because of a high inflation 
rate believed to have resulted from vote buying, combined with the sudden 
rise in fuel prices. Hordes of people demonstrated by walking to work; 
police confronted the demonstrators with brute force. Although they have 
since subsided in intensity, opposition protests have continued and have also 
59 See B Daumarie & E Leahy Madson The Effects of a Very Young Age Structure in Uganda  
Country Case Study (2010) <http://populationaction.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/SOTC_
Uganda_CCS.pdf> 5. 
60 Ibid 8.
61 See F Jjuuko ‘Law and Access to Justice’ <http://www kituochakatiba.org/index2.
php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=203&Itemid=27>.
62 See ‘Stand Warned; People are Waking up to their Rights’ The Observer (31 August 2009).
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inspired service delivery related protests. Gradually, a culture is building to 
the effect that people must demonstrate, sometimes violently, in order for their 
voices to be heard.
(b)  South Africa
As part of the transition from apartheid to democracy, the African National 
Congress (ANC) focused on transforming local government by moving away 
from the racially designed and discriminatory local government structures to 
democratically elected non-racial local governments. One of the immediate 
aims was to achieve the amalgamation of formerly white areas with the black 
townships and informal settlements under a unitary administrative control.63
The transformation of local government started with a transitional 
legislative regime, which largely focused on amalgamation. This was 
followed with a permanent legal framework. According to the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, South Africa comprises the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government, which are distinct, interdependent 
and interrelated.64 The ‘local sphere of government’ is defined in Chapter 7 
to consist of municipalities.65 The objects of local government are defined 
to include: providing democratic and accountable government for local 
communities; ensuring provision of services to communities in a suitable 
manner; promoting social and economic development; promoting a safe and 
healthy environment; and encouraging the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in matters of local government.66
The Constitution is also instrumental in as far as it defines the functions of 
the different spheres of government as detailed in schedules 4 and 5. It is on the 
basis of this that budgeting is done, resources are mobilised, and obligations 
understood, especially as they relate to the realisation of the economic and 
social rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
One issue of concern is that of ‘unfunded mandates’. This has been defined 
as arising from a situation where a branch of government performs functions 
outside its prescribed functions and for which it has no funding.67 Besides 
shrinking the policy making space of local governments,68 unfunded mandates 
have the potential of eating into local resources that could have been used 
for pre-determined services, thereby affecting access to the latter. Although 
there are some guarantees in the law against the negative effects of unfunded 
63 See C Pycrof ‘Democracy and Delivery: The Rationalization of Local Government in South 
Africa’ (2000) 66 Int Review of Administrative Sciences 143, 145.
64 Constitution s 40.
65 Ibid s 151(1).
66 Ibid s 152(1).
67 Financial and Fiscal Commission ‘The Impact of Unfunded Mandates in South African 
Intergovernmental Relations’ (2011) 3 Policy Brief 2.
68 See N Steytler, J de Visser & R Williams ‘Unfunded Mandates: Directing Subnational 
Governments’ Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Association of 
Centers for Federal Studies, Speyer (1 October 2011) <http://www.foev-speyer.de/veranstaltungen/
IACFS/Steytler%20De%20Visser%20and%20Williams%20-%20unfunded%20mandates.pdf>.
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mandates in the form of following through with a consultation process as 
enumerated in ss 9 and 10 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, it is not 
certain that the interests of local governments will always be considered.69 In 
addition to eating into resources as indicated above, this has resulted in the 
diversion of the attention of local governments, with their limited capacity, to 
function outside their mandates, thereby indirectly affecting their capacity to 
deliver services.
The law most relevant to municipalities in relation to service delivery 
is the Municipal Systems Act. This law was promulgated among others to 
establish core principles, mechanisms and processes that are necessary to 
enable municipalities to move progressively towards the social and economic 
development of local communities. This is in addition to ensuring universal 
access to services that are affordable.70 The Act is also intended to establish 
mechanisms that empower the poor and ensure that municipalities put in place 
service tariffs and credit control policies that take the needs of the poor into 
account.71
The Municipal Systems Act defines the rights of the community to 
include the following: contributing to the decision-making processes of the 
municipality; to be informed of decisions made; to use and enjoy public 
facilities; and to have access to municipal services, subject to certain duties, 
which includes payment of fees where applicable.72 Correspondingly, the 
municipalities have a wide range of duties, which include: being responsive 
to the needs of the local community; facilitating the culture of public service 
and accountability by staff of local government; and giving communities full 
and accurate information about the level and standard of services they are 
entitled to.73 Some of the above rights and duties are defined with more detail 
in chapters of the Act. Chapter 8, for instance, is dedicated to the subject of 
services, defining the duties of the municipalities to include giving priority 
to the basic needs of the community and ensuring that all members of the 
community have access to at least the minimum levels of basic municipal 
services.74 While requiring municipal services to be equitable and accessible, 
the Act requires the services to be provided in a manner that is conducive 
to the prudent, economic, efficient and effective use of available resources. 
This is in addition to ensuring that the services are financially sustainable.75 
The Act also defines principles to guide municipal tariff policies, which 
are among others things, intended to address the needs of poor households. 
Poor households are supposed to have access to at least basic services, either 
69 J De Visser Developmental Local Government  A Case-study of South Africa (2005) 144.
70 See objectives of the Municipal Systems Act.
71 Ibid.
72 Municipal Systems Act s 5(1) & (2). 
73 Ibid s 6(2).
74 Ibid s 73(1) (emphasis added).
75 Ibid s 73(2).
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through tariffs that cover only operating costs, through special or life line 
tariffs, or through direct and indirect subsidisation.76
It should be noted that although the legal mandate of local governments in 
South Africa is clearly defined as seen in the legal framework, the system of 
local governance has faced some challenges. In many respects, the system 
of local government is a manifestation of ‘government failure’, which is 
the inability of government to achieve its intended outcomes.77 With regard 
to service delivery, local government failure in South Africa is broadly 
associated with the limitations of South Africa’s macro-economic model, 
which has failed to advance inclusive economic and human development.78 
It has been illustrated that under this model, municipalities are under 
considerable financial pressure to limit services to households that cannot 
pay for them, as the income derived from water, electricity and sanitation 
services is the most important source of revenue for local government.79 In 
addition to the impact of this economic model, local government failure, as is 
illustrated below, has been the failure to effectively utilise spaces for public 
participation in the decision-making process and empowering communities 
to influence outcomes in line with their needs. These failures have largely 
been responsible for the wave of service delivery protests that have rocked 
the country. The failures are explained below and in relation to the service 
delivery protests.
The government is cognisant of the challenges that the local government 
system is facing. In 2009, the Department of Cooperative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs adopted what it described as the Local Government 
Turnaround Strategy. In this strategy, government acknowledges the fact that 
local governments are not working as effectively as they should because of a 
number of problems linked to: systemic factors; policy and legislative factors; 
political factors, capacity and skills constraints; weak inter-governmental 
support and oversight; and inter-governmental fiscal system issues.80 One of 
the bases of the strategy is what is described as the objectives of an ideal local 
government, which include: providing democratic and accountable government 
for local communities; being responsive to the needs of the local community; 
ensuring the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 
promoting social and economic development; promoting a safe and healthy 
environment; encouraging the involvement of communities and community 
organisations in the matters of local government; facilitating a culture of 
public service and accountability amongst its staff; and assigning clear 
76 Ibid s 74(2)(c). 
77 A Buthelezi & B Dollery ‘An Exploratory Analysis of Local Government Failure in South Africa’ 
(2004) 28 Studies in Economics and Econometrics 91, 92.
78 J Dugard ‘urban Basic Services in South Africa: Rights, Reality and Resistance’ in M Langford 
et al (eds) Symbols or Substance  The Role and Impact of Socio-Economic Rights Strategies in 
South Africa [Forthcoming] 1. See also P Bond ‘South Africa’s Bubble Meets Boiling urban 
Social Protest’ (2010) 62 Monthly Review <http://monthlyreview.org/2010/06/01/bond>.
79 Dugard (note 78 above) 2.
80 Department of Cooperative Government and Traditional Affairs Local Government Turn Around 
Strategy 3.
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responsibilities for the management and coordination of the administrative 
units and mechanisms.81
It is on the basis of the above that the Turnaround Strategy sets out what 
needs to be done to tackle the problems that municipalities are facing. 
This includes: ensuring that municipalities meet the basic service needs 
of communities; building a clean, effective, efficient, responsive and 
accountable local government; improving performance and professionalism 
in municipalities; improving national and provincial policy, oversight 
and support; and strengthening partnerships between local government, 
communities and civil society. Unfortunately, many targets set by the strategy 
have not been realised, among others due to the failure of government to 
commit resources to the implementation of the strategy.82 With the increasing 
numbers of service delivery protests, it is clear that the strategy is yet to tackle 
the service delivery factors that result into protests.
(i)  The protests in South Africa
Although South Africa has had a history of protests, inspired by strong 
social movements, the service delivery protests that have rocked the country 
in recent years are unprecedented. In August 2005, residents of Khutsong 
township in the Free State protested over service delivery and municipal 
demarcations by burning and looting shops, disrupting schools, damaging 
property, and blockading roads.83 The Khutsong protests were followed 
with countrywide protests that bust out like popcorn. The protests have 
been characterised by mass meetings, drafting memoranda, petitions, ‘toyi-
toying’,84 processions, stayaways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, 
construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, 
chasing unpopular individuals from townships, and confrontations with 
the police.85 What has also characterised the South African protests is that 
while they appear spontaneous, many of them are usually well organised and 
normally planned at open public meetings. Although sometimes sparked off 
by spontaneous events such as the failure to provide prize money at a sports 
event in Voortrekker in 2009, they are mostly caused by deep discontent with 
the level of service delivery and the ineffectiveness of the available channels 
of participatory democracy.86
81 Ibid 5. 
82 See J Mettler ‘Local Government Turnaround Strategy – Constraints and Successes’ Paper 
presented at the Institute for Municipal Finance Officers (IMFO) Conference (September 2011) 
<www.imfo.co.za/conference2011/Johann%20Mettler.ppt>. 
83 See ‘Service-delivery Protesters Run Riot in Free State’ Mail & Guardian (23 August 2005) 
<http://mg.co.za/article/2005-08-23-servicedelivery-protesters-run-riot-in-free-state>.
84 This is an organised street dance accompanied by singing as a sign of solidarity among protesters.
85 P Alexander ‘Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests – A Preliminary 
Analysis’ (2010) 37 Rewiew of South African Political Economy 25, 26.
86 See L Sinwell et al ‘Service Delivery Protests: Findings from Quick Response Research on Four 
“Hotspots” – Piet Retief, Balfour, Thokoza, Diepsloot’ (September 2009) Centre for Sociological 
Research, University of Johannesburg. 
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By 2007, the protests were averaging 8.7 protests in a given month, moving 
to 9.8 in 2008, 19.1 in 2009 and had reached 16.33 by 2010.87 The protests 
were against rising costs and declining access to such services as water, 
electricity and sanitation.88 Ironically, the protests came at a time when most 
municipalities had intensified efforts to implement policies that assured the 
poor access to free basic services including water and electricity. Susan 
Booysen has explained that even with the free services, the poor were plunged 
into debt traps when their consumption exceeded the free allowances, yet 
pressured for revenue, municipalities started implementing cut-offs.89 As a 
result, although a lot of money had been invested in extending services such 
as water and electricity to places that previously lacked these, many residents 
were still not enjoying the services because of disconnections arising from 
failure to pay.90
Most importantly, however, the service delivery crisis and the protests are 
indicators of the failure of local democracy. Elsewhere, I have illustrated the 
democracy deficit that has characterised local governance in South Africa, 
arising from the lack of meaningful participation of local communities in the 
decision-making processes.91 As Lilian Chenwi and Kate Tissington illustrate, 
the protests could be explained by poor communication and relationships 
of accountability with communities; weak community participation; and 
community alienation caused by not giving enough attention to ‘bottom-up’ 
planning and consultative processes.92 The manifestations of the alienation of 
the communities resulting from the absence of councillor representation has 
been summarised by Booysen:
South African local government from the mid-1990s on, and especially in the period 2000–
06, fell short of … [the] ideal model … reports of councillors effectively abandoning their 
communities prevailed in many parts of the country … ‘Absentee representation’ ruled the 
day: Councillors were often neither resident in their communities nor were they available for 
consultation with their constituencies.93
In some circles, the service delivery protests, together with the xenophobic 
attacks that rocked the country in 2008, were viewed as an impact of more 
structured factors defining South African citizenship. It was reckoned that 
87 See J Hirsh Community Protests in South Africa  Trends, Analysis and Explanations’ (2010) 
Community Law Centre, Local Government Working Paper Series 1. 
88 Bond (note 78 above). 
89 S Booysen ‘With the Ballot and the Brick: The Politics of Attaining Service Delivery’ (2007) 7 
Progress in Development Studies 21, 24. 
90 J Dugard ‘Civic Action and Legal Mobilisation: The Phiri Water Meters Case’ in R Berkhout & J 
Handmaker (eds) Mobilising Social Justice in South Africa  Perspectives from Researchers and 
Practitioners (2010) 178.
91 See C Mbazira ‘Grootboom: A Paradigm of Individual Remedies versus Reasonable Programmes’ 
(2011) 26 SAPL 60, 69.
92 L Chenwi & K Tissington ‘Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights: 
A Focus on the Right to Housing’ (March 2010) Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community 
Law Centre, University of the Western Cape 7.
93 Booysen (note 89 above) 23. See also C Bénit-Gbaffou ‘Are Practices of Local Participation 
Sidelining the Institutional Participatory Channels? Reflections from Johannesburg’ (2008) 
66/67 Transformation  Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa 1.
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there is a rapid process of class formation characterised by an emerging new 
elite, on the one hand, and on the other by an unemployed or precariously 
employed class. Additionally, dislocations in the transition from apartheid to 
democracy were generating fierce struggles over inclusion and exclusion both 
within the elite, between elites and subalterns, and within the subaltern classes 
themselves.94 However, be it as it may, poor performance on the service delivery 
front and the lack of meaningful engagement with constituencies remained 
a major factor. This is what Booysen has described as ‘the fertile bases of 
dissatisfaction with social conditions and … alienation from institutions of 
local government’.95
Many of the protests started in a non-violent manner, with public meetings 
to discuss community problems and express dissatisfaction with local leaders, 
and in some cases characterised by years of appealing to local authorities to 
address the problems raised.96 In many of the meetings, the members would 
resolve to march to the local government offices and hand over memoranda 
detailing their dissatisfaction and calling for action. Unfortunately, again in 
many cases, the marches turned violent, sometimes after police provocation, 
although in others police swung into action when protesters became violent.97 
In some cases, it was not easy to determine which side, police or the protesters, 
provoked violence. The police has however been accused of handling some of 
the protests in a brutal manner.98 One incident, captured on camera, and one 
which caused public outcry, was the death of Andries Tatane who was shot 
and beaten by police on 13 April 2011 at a protest in Ficksburg. Tatane was a 
community leader who had mobilised his community and worked tirelessly to 
ensure that the voices of his community were heard. In Voortrekker, a 29-year-
old male was shot by the guard at the mayor’s house.99 In Thandakukhanya, 
two males, aged 29 and 21 respectively were shot dead.100
Marcelle Dawson has examined the subject of policing protests from a 
wide perspective, by among others analysing legislative developments and 
the impact that these have had on the approach of the police when dealing 
with protesters.101 Dawson, for instance, illustrates how the 2009 amendment 
to Criminal Procedure Code, allowing the police to shoot at fleeing criminals, 
has influenced how the police handle protests. Also true is the fact that the 
94 K von Holdt et al ‘The Smoke that Calls: Insurgent Citizenship, Collective Violence and the 
Struggle for a Place in the New South Africa’ (2011) The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation and Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the Witwatersrand 6.
95 Booysen (note 89 above) 24.
96 See Von Holdt et al (note 94 above) 33; and Sinwell et al (note 86 above).
97 See Bandeira & Craig’s description of the protests in Kungcatsh, Azania, Trouble and Ficksburg; 
M Bandeira & C Higson-Smith ‘Responding to the Smoke the Calls: Principles of Community 
Level Intervention for Collective Violence’ (2011) The Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation and Society, Work and Development Institute, University of the Witwatersrand.
98 See E Ferreira ‘ICD: Rise in Police Abuse at Service Delivery Protests’ Mail & Guardian (14 June 
2011) <http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-14-icd-rise-in-police-abuse-at-service-delivery-protests>.
99 Von Holdt et al (note 94 above) 8.
100 Sinwell et al (note 86 above) 2. 
101 M Dawson ‘Resistance and Repression: Policing Protest in Post-Apartheid South Africa’ in 
Berkhout & Handmaker (note 90 above) 101.
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police have not adequately been trained on crowd management, which has 
resulted in residents, who are exercising their freedom of assembly, being 
confronted by a police force encouraged to use maximum force in response to 
the high incidence of crime in the country.102
In many cases, the protests have attracted the attention of top government 
officials. In August 2009, for instance, President Zuma made a surprise visit 
to Siyathemba township in Balfour, Mpumalanga, an area that had been 
rocked by violent protests.103 Around the same time, the Minister of Human 
Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, visited Diepsloot, announcing that he had come 
to understand the problems that the people face.104 The minister even spent a 
night in the shack of one of the residents, purportedly to enable him to better 
understand the suffering that shack dwellers experience.105 In some cases, the 
ANC reacted by firing local politicians, including mayors and councillors.106 
The ANC, in these cases, struggled to impress the local communities that 
the problem does not lie with the ANC at the national level of government, 
but rather with inefficiencies of the leadership at the local level.107 According 
to Dugard, at least in the short-term, a local problem could be diffused and 
rising dissatisfaction over poverty and inequality could be moderated through 
the removal of specific councillors, while the central political economy stays 
intact and the ANC remains overwhelmingly popular.108
It should be noted that the evidence on the ground complicates the protests, 
which on the surface appear to be service delivery related, or triggered by 
service delivery failures; yet at the bottom, are deep and complex political 
issues. This could explain why, although the protests appear to be directed at the 
ANC, the party has remained strong and continues to win support at elections. 
Some of the protests have been fanned by dissent forces and factions within 
the ANC itself, sometimes led by ANC politicians who feel marginalised and 
their contribution to the ANC ignored. In some cases, leaders of the protests 
are ANC members who did not make it to the party’s list, which would have 
given them access to political office.109 A study conducted by the Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) and the Society, Work and 
Development Institute of the University of the Witwatersrand, shows that the 
organisers in some of the protests were officials of the local ANC branches, 
102 Ibid 108.
103 See ‘Zuma Visit Pays Off for Balfour’ Independent Online (7 September 2009) <http://www iol.
co.za/news/south-africa/zuma-visit-pays-off-for-balfour-1.457699#.uA05KrROCOu>.
104 See ‘Sexwale Fails to Impress Cynical Residents’ Mail & Guardian (9 August 2009) <http://
mg.co.za/article/2009-08-10-sexwale-fails-to-impress-cynical-residents>. 
105 See ‘Rich Tokyo Spends Night Among Poor’ Independent Online (4 August 2009) <http://www.
iol.co.za/news/politics/rich-tokyo-spends-night-among-poor-1.453846#.uA08TLROCOu>.
106 See for instance, A Moselakgomo ‘Mayor is Fired after Mashishing Protests’ Sowetan (3 
September 2009) <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2009/09/03/mayor-is-fired 
-after-mashishing-protests>. 
107 Dugard (note 78 above) 20.
108 Ibid 21.
109 M Hough ‘Violent Protest at Local Government Level in South Africa: Revolutionary Potential?’ 
(2008) 36 Scientia Militaria, SA J of Military Studies 1, 6. 
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in many cases opposing ANC local government officials.110 In some cases, the 
local power shifts within the ANC had occurred, thereby sparking conflicts 
between the different local ANC official and raising questions of who goes in 
and who goes out of local government leadership.111 Unfortunately, the ANC 
appears to be glossing over these dynamics, and in some cases associating the 
protests to a ‘third force’ and most recently to ‘criminal elements’ that have 
infiltrated the communities with hidden agendas.112 The recent declaration 
by the ANC Youth League in the Western Cape that the league was going 
to incite protests and make the city ungovernable unless services are 
delivered complicates the situation even further.113 It turns the protests into a 
confrontation between the ANC and the opposition in areas controlled by the 
latter and raises questions on the role of communities in this regard.
III  the parallels anD DIvergences
There are similarities but also differences between the context and protests 
in uganda and South Africa. In the first place, in both countries, local 
governments have become the major vehicles for the provision of services. 
Yet, in both countries, these governments have not performed as effectively 
as expected, seen mainly in the failure of local democracy, which has resulted 
in a failure to effectively involve the local populations in the decision-making 
processes.114 This has been in addition to the unresponsiveness to the needs 
and demands of the people. The failure to nurture downward accountability 
and promote effective community participation could be explained by a range 
of factors, including incompetence and lack of skills on the part of the local 
institutions to mobilise and involve communities. There has been a general 
failure to appreciate, or, at the very least, put into practice, development models 
guided by a rights-based approach and based on community participation as 
a pre-requisite for economic and social development. At the same time, the 
patronising nature of local bureaucrats and politicians cannot be ruled out, 
and could, among others, be linked to the rising local predatory class. In 
spite of the fact that the courts have confirmed the duty on the state to ensure 
meaningful community participation as a constitutional imperative,115 in what 
in some cases the courts have described as ‘meaningful engagement’,116 the 
duty has not been fully discharged.
110 Von Holdt et al (note 94 above) 9. 
111 Ibid 10.
112 See ‘Mangaung ANC “link” to New Wave of Protests’ Business Day (7 August 2012).
113 M Williams ‘We won’t Mess up Cape Town, ANC Says’ Independent Online (7 August 2012) 
<http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/we-won-t-mess-up-cape-anc-says-1.1357774>. 
114 See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC); 
Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC); and 
Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 (5) SA 171 (CC). 
115 See C Tapscott & L Thompson ‘Participatory Development in South Africa: Between Rhetoric 
and Practice’ (2010) Paper presented to the 14th International Research Society for Public 
Management Conference, Berne Switzerland, 6–8 April. 
116 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
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As is the case in South Africa, local government in Uganda has created 
a predatory elite class represented by the local politicians and bureaucrats, 
thereby fomenting resentment in what appears to be a class struggle with 
protests as a tool.117 In Uganda, recent press reports for instance have indicated 
that municipal mayors and town council chairpersons were through their 
association, Urban Authorities Association of Uganda (UAAU) demanding a 
400 per cent salary increment.118 In October 2011, through their association, 
the South African Local Government Association (SALGA), councillors 
demanded that they not only be paid by the national Treasury but their 
salaries and other emoluments be increased to match those paid to provincial 
politicians.119
Although the broad policy motivation for decentralisation in both Uganda 
and South Africa appears to be the same: building local democracy and moving 
services close to the people in line with their needs, there are some differences 
in the legal frameworks of the two countries. In Uganda, the framework, 
as can be seen through its Constitution and Local Government Act, thinly 
defines service delivery as a central mandate of local government. Instead, as 
illustrated above, much of the law is dedicated to defining the administrative 
structures, offices and portfolios and the procedures of elections. In contrast, 
in South Africa, the framework puts services at the centre of local government 
by defining the service related rights of communities and the duties of local 
government in this regard.
The South African approach is bolstered by the constitutional framework 
which, unlike that of Uganda, expressly guarantees a number of socio-
economic rights such as housing, water, food and health care, as justiciable 
rights.120 Indeed, as illustrated by Jackie Dugard, in South Africa, some 
service delivery protests have been complimented by legal action in the form 
of constitutional petitions challenging the non-provision of services.121 In 
contrast, the Ugandan Constitution does not comprehensively protect socio-
economic rights as justiciable rights. The bulk of the rights are only protected 
as part of Directive Principles of state policy. Yet, although the Constitution 
creates opportunities for litigation of these rights through provisions allowing 
for public interest litigation, this has not generated as much litigation as one 
would have expected.122
What remains puzzling though is the fact that the differences in the legal 
frameworks notwithstanding, both countries have had unsatisfactory service 
117 D Cammack et al ‘Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralisation and Local Government: Uganda and 
Malawi in 2006’ (December 2007) Good Governance, Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction 
Working Paper 2, 10.
118 ‘Municipal Mayors Want 400% Salary Increment’ New Vision (23 July 2012).
119 See M Pietersen ‘Pay us More – Councillors’ Independent Online (2 September 2011) <http://
www.iol co.za/news/politics/pay-us-more-councillors-1 1130133#.uA1NO7ROCOu>.
120 See Constitution ss 26, 27 & 28. 
121 See Dugard (note 78 above).
122 See, C Mbazira ‘Public Interest Litigation and Judicial Activism in uganda: Improving the 
Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (February 2009) Human Rights and 
Peace Centre Working Paper 24.
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delivery at the local government levels. One thing which stands out in South 
Africa are the contradictions in the legal framework, which promote service 
related rights and appear to accommodate the needs of the poor yet at the same 
time promote costs recovery.123 As illustrated by Dugard, the municipalities 
are under pressure to become financially self-sufficient and are in this respect 
not expected to have any deficits in their budgets, which has forced them to 
pursue a commercialised approach to service delivery.124 At the same time, 
the law as reflected in the Municipal Systems Act requires municipalities to 
contribute, together with other organs of state, to the progressive realisation 
of the fundamental rights contained in ss 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29 of the 
Constitution.125 These constitutional provisions guarantee access to a range of 
rights including housing, water, food and healthcare services.
In South Africa, in some cases, the protests have been pursued 
simultaneously with the use of the rights-based legal framework to protect and 
enforce the economic and social rights protected in the Constitution. This has 
created interplay between the legal processes and some of the protests, thereby 
establishing a dialectical relationship between these two as strategies.126 The 
dialectical relationship shows that litigation can be used as a tool for social 
mobilisation and building alliances, which, as was the case in Mazibuko v 
City of Johannesburg,127 can result in gains even when the case is lost. In spite 
of losing the case in the Constitutional Court, the social mobilisation exerted 
pressure on the City to change its approach and be more responsive to the 
water needs of the poor. This approach is yet to be used in Uganda.
Additionally, both countries have experienced management deficiencies at 
the local government level. This is among others depicted in the financial 
management flaws, which both countries are experiencing. In South Africa, 
the recently released Auditor General’s Report shows that only 13 (5 per cent) 
out of the 343 municipalities in the country had clean audits. This does not 
include any of the country’s metros.128 None of the municipalities in such 
provinces as Gauteng, the Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Cape and North 
West made it to the list of those with clean audits. It has been indicated that 45 
per cent obtained unqualified audit reports. This figure tallies with the picture 
in uganda, where in the financial year ending 30 June 2011, only 45 per cent 
of local governments obtained unqualified financial audits.129 This seemingly 
coincidental situation shows that local governments in both countries are 
performing at a level less than satisfactory as far as financial management is 
concerned, which is in turn affecting service delivery.
123 See Dugard (note 78 above) 1; and Bond (note 78 above). 
124 Dugard (note 90 above) 77.
125 Municipal Systems Act s 4(2)(j).
126 Dugard (note 90 above) 85–94. See also J Dugard & M Langford ‘Art or Science? Synthesising 
Lessons from Public Interest Litigation and the Dangers of Legal Determinism’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 
39. 
127 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
128 See ‘Only 13 Municipalities in the Whole Country have “Good Books”’ Sowetan (23 July 2012).
129 See Auditor General’s Report (note 38 above) 13.
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Unlike the case in Uganda, the protests in South Africa have been fairly 
well organised. South Africa has a history of organised civil disobedience and 
social mobilisation, which was used as a tool against the apartheid regime.130 
Uganda does not enjoy a comparable experience. Attempts to build civil 
disobedience and social movements in Uganda were strangled during the 
time of colonial rule.131 In South Africa, some of the tactics used by the social 
movements characterised by well-organised community mobilisation have 
survived and been used by some of the protest leaders. As indicated above, 
many of the protests have been preceded with well-organised public meetings 
and writing of memoranda. One commonality though is that at the centre of 
the protest in both countries have been the unemployed youths, described by 
Dugard as the new generation of fighters.132 This does not however mean that 
the other members of the disgruntled communities are not part of the protests. 
What makes the youth visible is that they are usually the ones at the frontlines 
and engaging in running battles with the police.
In spite of the above differences in the levels of organisation, the increasing 
incidents of protests in both countries can be explained by the deep-seated 
discontent with the levels of service delivery and the ineffectiveness of the 
structures of participatory decision-making.133 In both countries, people have 
run out of patience waiting for the socio-economic transformation which 
liberation movements incarnated in the ruling parties, NRM and ANC, 
promised.
The range of services that have been the subject of protests also differ; 
in South Africa the major focus has been on housing, water and electricity. 
In contrast, in Uganda, in addition to electricity (mainly interruption and 
non-connection), the protests have focused on bad roads and poor healthcare 
services. It is not clear why ‘poor health care services’ has not been the subject 
of protests in South Africa, as there are serious deficiencies in the sector. This 
is a matter that merits separate investigation.
In both countries, the response of the police to the protests has been 
characterised with brutality and uncalled for violence. In the case of South 
Africa, the context in which police forces have brutalised protesters exercising 
their freedom of assembly has already been illustrated above. In Uganda, the 
police force is generally characterised by a number of irregularities. The 
police ranks as one of the most corrupt public institutions riddled with abuse 
of power, unprofessionalism, political impartiality and alienation from the 
community.134 Yet, the clandestine and unprofessional manner in which the 
130 See, R Ballard ‘Social Movements in Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Introduction’ in P Jones 
& K Stokke (eds) Democratising Development  The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa (2005) 77.
131 See M Mamdani Politics and Class Formation in Uganda (1999).
132 Dugard (note 78 above) 13.
133 See Nyirinkindi (note 40 above); Sinwell et al (note 86 above); and Von Holdt et al (note 94 
above). 
134 See Common Wealth Human Rights Initiative The Police, The People, The Politics  Police 
Accountability in Uganda (2006). See also ZZ Nagujja ‘Human Rights and Structure of Police 
and Internal Security Forces in uganda’ (1997) 14 Third World Legal Studies 103.
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police force has handled public demonstrations is not different from South 
Africa. This is in the main attributable to inadequate training and negligence 
on the part of members of the force.135
The exercise of police powers in policing protests needs to be understood 
against the human rights implications of protest action. Police need to 
understand that protest is a right which needs to be protected. It has been 
argued that public protest is part of freedom of expression, and used by 
persons to ensure that free speech reaches the targeted audiences.136 By the 
protests, such groups ‘are able to gain access to the media through publicity 
and to persuade members of their immediate audience to sympathise with 
their stance’.137 As early as the 1960s, one scholar described protests as a new 
moral-political force being used to challenge political alienation and find 
fulcrum for political leverage, and that protests should be viewed as ‘obedience’ 
and not ‘disobedience’.138 This is because protests are an act in the pattern of 
democratic tradition and part of the freedom of expression.139 Harrop Freeman 
traced the technique of protests to Mahatma Ghandi, who used it as a tool 
of effecting change within the law when the law’s normal procedures were 
inadequate or were held captive by anti-legal forces.140 Ghandi’s philosophy of 
protest, satyagrah, was influenced by Hindu philosophy that the most effective 
sacrifice was self-sacrifice and suffering, while refusing to injure others.141 
Freeman uses the term ‘civil disobedience’ as one of the forms of protests, 
and describes its characteristics to include: (a) it is an intentional chosen act 
not occasioned by accident; (b) it is used to call attention to injustice and to 
change conditions; (c) it is non-violent, at least in origin; (d) it is a form of 
communication; (e) it is used by those who are otherwise barred from exerting 
power; and (f) may be legal or illegal.142
One shortcoming with Freeman’s article though is that it does not expressly 
address the question of whether or not violent protest is justified. He defines 
‘violence’ as the wilful application of physical force in such a way that it is 
physically injurious to the person or group subjected to the force.143
It has been indicated that the means used by the protesters will only be 
justified by demands of democratic expression, but only as long as they are not 
outweighed by the threat posed by the action.144 According to Helen Fenwick, 
even if a group does not seek to persuade others, by the group’s actions 
‘the democratic process may be said to have been circumvented rather than 
135 J Oloka-Onyango ‘Taking Orders from Above: Police Powers, Politics and Democratic 
Governance in Post-Movement uganda’ (2011) HURIPEC Working Paper 31, 24.
136 H Fenwick ‘The Right to Protest, the Human Rights Act and the Margin of Appreciation’ (1999) 
62 MLR 491, 492.
137 Ibid 493. 
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underpinned’.145 Although the right to protest has been acknowledged, the use 
of violent repertoires has been castigated.146 This is the same approach which 
has been adopted by international human rights law as it guarantees only the 
‘right to peaceful assembly’.147
The United Nations has adopted international standards that among others 
regulate policing of assemblies. These are contained in the United Nations 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials.148 The principles provide that in the dispersal of assemblies that 
are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of 
force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum 
extent necessary.149 In the dispersal of violent assemblies, law enforcement 
officials are required to use firearms only when less dangerous means are not 
practicable and only to the minimum extent necessary. Yet, law enforcement 
officials shall not use firearms in such cases, except under the conditions 
stipulated in principle 9. 150 Principle 9 provides that officials shall not use 
firearms against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against 
the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the perpetration of 
a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person 
presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his or her 
escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these 
objectives. That, in any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be 
made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.
Iv  conclusIon
Although decentralisation has been embraced by both South Africa and 
Uganda as a vehicle for service delivery at the local levels, effective service 
delivery has not been realised at these levels. In both countries, the local 
governments are characterised by poor management, maladministration 
and abuse of finances. From the point of view of local democracy, one of the 
incentives of decentralisation, there has largely been a failure of democracy at 
this level. The ability of people to articulate their own needs, directly influence 
policies and actively participate in the processes through which these needs 
145 Ibid.
146 D della Porta ‘Protest, Protesters, and Protest Policing: Public Discourses in Italy and Germany 
from the 1960s to the 1980s’ in M Giugni, D McAdam & C Tilly (eds) How Social Movements 
Matter (1999) 66, 81. 
147 See art 20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); art 21 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966); and art 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). 
On its part though, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights subjects the exercise of 
the right to free assembly ‘only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those 
enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of 
others’ (see art 11). 
148 Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Havana, Cuba (27 August to 7 September 1990).
149 Principle 13.
150 Principle 14.
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can be satisfied has largely failed.151 Where participation has occurred, it has 
not been meaningful, and on some occasions the processes have been hijacked 
by politicians and bureaucrats, who are part of the emerging predatory local 
elite.
While the contexts in the two countries may differ, both countries have 
experienced a wave of service delivery protests in which people have risen up 
against their local governments demanding better services. In both countries, 
the protests have been caused not only by frustration about services but also 
by the failure of the local governments to take into account the voices of the 
local communities in decision-making processes. The protests also arise from 
the loss of confidence in the governments because of the failure to meet the 
needs of the people, in spite of promises to do so as part of transformation. 
Nonetheless, the protests in the two countries have differed in magnitude and 
levels of organisation. The South African protests have taken advantage of 
a history of social mobilisation to be massive, organised and in some cases 
drawn-out.
In both countries, there is an urgent need to build the civic competence 
of the local communities and to ensure that there are operational and 
effective structures for civic participation. To borrow from Laura Nyrikindi, 
it is necessary for local governments to develop awareness and information 
dissemination mechanisms in user-friendly forms and avail these regularly 
in order to build the capacity of the local communities to participate 
meaningfully in the service decision-making processes.152 In the same respect, 
local governments should address the structural bottlenecks that constrain 
meaningful participation in decision-making and go beyond the structured 
statutory procedures.153
151 Dawson (note 101 above) 109.
152 Nyirinkindi (note 40 above) 54. 
153 Ibid. 
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